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1.　Introduction
In recent years many economic/political discussions have been flourished on possible 
economic integration in East Asia including al ASEAN countries.　Asian common money 
(ACM) or Asian common unit (ACU) has been also proposed by several authors.　Although this 
movement has been stemmed mainly from the idea to avoid such a serious economic and financial 
crisis in the late 1990’s, we must pay careful atention to the late comer ASEAN countries, i.e., 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV).　Many discussions on integration issues 
seem to disregard the reality of deep divide, compared to more developed countries in the region, 
both in terms of income per capita and underdeveloped financial institutions in CLMV countries.1) 
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1) In recent years, the economic and business development of Vietnam is outstanding; therefore we may 
restrict atention to only CLM in this context.
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To establish a successful economic integration in this region, it is very important not to disre-
gard but to include CLMV countries.　To do so, the developed countries should assist CLMV 
countries by various means to narow the gap between the two groups of countries in East Asia.
In this paper, we do not discuss on this divide issues directly.　We concentrate on mac-
roeconomic issues of Lao PDR in order to point out its problems and chalenges existing ahead 
of possible integration with other East Asian countries.
In the next section we consider the peculiar multicurrency phenomenon (MCP) in Laos.　
This MCP has merits and demerits (Menon (2006)) and itself is a not necessarily bad 
phenomenon.　However, it restricts efectiveness of monetary policy and also provides compli-
cated situation when we consider curency integration.
In section three, we conduct some empirical studies on efects of MCP.　First, we inquire 
into the causal relations of the two popular foreign currencies in Laos, i.e., the US dolar rate 
and the Thai baht rate of the domestic currency, kip.　Folowing that, we conduct econometric 
simulation analyses based on an econometric model with alternative foreign exchange arrange-
ments, including kip/dolar rate, kip/baht rate, nominal efective rate, and an Asian common unit.　
In the last section, we conclude our arguments.
2.　Characteristics of Dolarization in Laos
2.1　General Concept of Dolarization
Dolarization is a phenomenon of a country’s portfolio shift away from domestic currency 
to foreign currency (or currencies) to maintain the main function of money as a store of value, 
unit of account, and/or medium of exchange.　Historicaly, the US dolar and Deutsche mark 
(or euro in recent years) has been widely used as money together with domestic currency in 
developing and transition economies.
The depth and range of dolarization vary across countries.　The most popular experiences 
have been observed in Latin American countries, where the US dolar has been widely used in 
paralel with domestic currencies.　Some countries abolish domestic currency and oficialy 
adopt the US dolar as their currency.　Examples include Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama.　
By doing so, they have efectively adopted and folowed the US monetary policy to maintain 
macroeconomic stability.　This is caled ful or oficial dolarization. (Watanabe (2006), Menon 
(2007)).　In many developing and transition countries, however, dolarization has been natu-
raly and gradualy developed to atain partial dolarization.　The case of Laos is not an exception.
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2.2　Three Currency Phenomenon as Dolarization
As mentioned above, usual dolarization is a phenomenon that both foreign and domestic 
curencies are used as money.　In that sense, dolarization is sometimes caled as multiple cur-
rency phenomenons (MCP) (Menon (2007)).　In Asian developing countries, the US dolar 
dominates the lists of foreign currencies; therefore it is widely used in addition to domestic 
currency.　In Laos, however, the Thai baht as wel as the US dolar is widely used in addition 
to the domestic currency, kip.　This three currency phenomenon or MCP constitutes the most 
significant peculiarity of dolarization in Laos.
We can distinguish three states (or causes) of dolarization in Lao PDR.2)　First, like many 
other developing countries, Laos has been receiving foreign curencies through both oficial and 
non-oficial means, including ODA, lending programs, foreign direct investment, and remit-
tance from overseas to families and relatives. Injection of foreign currencies through oficial 
and non-oficial transfer (mainly the US dolar) is an important source of dolarization in Laos.
The second state is curency substitution, which refers to the state where foreign curencies 
(mainly the US dolar and the Thai baht) are used in paralel with kip as a means of payment.　
As shown in Table 2.1, the trade balance is in chronic deficit reflecting high demand for imports.　
This means that the formal banking system and the Bank of Laos do not have suficient foreign 
curencies for accommodating the strong curency demand for importing purposes.　This forces 
people to go to the paralel market outside the formal banking system for foreign currency, 
which is also available at a higher exchange rate (Chaleunsinh (2003)).　In addition to this 
conventional process of dolarization, there is a unique geographical reason for Laos.　Chale-
unsinh (2003) and the Economist Group (2007) point out that Lao PDR has long frontiers with 
five neighboring countries, which use diferent currencies (e.g., Thai baht, Vietnamese dong, 
Chinese yuan, Cambodian riel, and Myanmar kyat).　The border trade along the Lao frontier, 
particularly with Thailand along the Mekong, plays an important role to inject foreign curren-
cies to Laos.　Chaleunsinh (2003) estimates the rough shares of each currencies to be used at 
the border transactions from the Lao side, which reports that kip’s share is only 30 percent, 
while baht’s share is also 30 percent and 10 percent each of the dolar, yuan and dong 
curencies.　Considering both domestic and border transactions, the Thai baht as wel as the US 
dolar constitute the two major foreign curencies with high liquidity in Lao PDR.
―　　―3
2) Watanabe (2006) points out that the usual literature classifies the state of dolarization into the two 
states, i.e., currency substitution and asset substitution.　However, we consider three states are 
important in Lao PDR.
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The third state is asset substitution, which refers to the state where foreign currencies are 
held as means of savings and/or store of value. Together with the progress of curency substitu-
tion, asset substitution prevailed from a quite early stage of development.　Therefore, the Lao 
government legalized foreign currency deposits in the banking system since the late 1980’s 
(The Economist Group (2007)). It is dificult to grapes the correct figures of foreign currencies 
which are held in the private sector for the asset purposes because, first, the banking system is 
stil underdeveloped, and second, people tend to keep foreign currencies at hand for future 
possible substitution with real assets like durable goods and precious metal.
Although the correct figures of foreign assets in Lao PDR are not available, the ratio of 
foreign currency deposits (FCD) to broad money, M2, is usualy used as a proxy measure of 
dolarization in terms of asset substitution.　Figure 2.1 shows the ratio of FCD to M2.　Before 
the period of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, it fluctuated around 0.3 to 0.4, but sharply 
increased to around 0.8 in 1997–1999.　Economic agents chose foreign currency denominated 
deposits as safer assets at the economicaly unstable period.　This means a sharp increase in 
demand for foreign currencies (the US dolar, in particular) arouse so that a sharp depreciation 
of domestic currency (kip) was created.　The figure also shows the sharp increase in FCD and 
also the sharp depreciation of kip resulted in a high growth of M2.　After 2000 the ratio 
FCD/M2 remains the same or has been a litle declining and the level of M2 has been 
controled as wel, so that M2 growth has been kept very low and stable.　Toyoda and 
Phouphet (2005a) also found that the percentage of savings deposits at banks denominated in 
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Figure 2.1　FCD/M2 and Growth of M2 
　　　　　　Source: The Macro and Finance Economist Group (2007) 
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dolars is quite high, particularly in the capital city, Vientiane.　The second high percentage is 
given by savings deposits denominated in baht.　Table 2.2 shows this fact.
2.3　Dolarization and Exchange Rate
As has been analyzed above, the US dolars and the Thai baht are the major dominated 
foreign curencies, which can be accepted as a means of payment and also of store of value. The 
Bank of Laos has been implementing the so-caled managed floating system. The BOL pays 
sole atention to the US dolars, but the actual dolarization means the widely spread use of the 
two foreign curencies.　According to Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the US dolar rate (i.e., kip vis-à-vis 
dolar) and the Thai baht rate (i.e., kip vis-à-vis baht) seem to move in paralel.　However, at 
the Asian economic and currency crisis in 1997, the Thai baht was sharply depreciated against 
the US dolar and kip was more depreciated than baht by several reasons.　One important 
reason is that demand for both currencies, dolar and baht, sharply increased and a doubly-
punched pressure of depreciation of kip prevailed.
However, experiencing such a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency and observing 
that the Thai baht was also depreciating vis-à-vis the US dolar, it was natural for the Lao 
authority to set a measure to adjust the domestic curency more to the US dolar (the world key 
curency) than any other foreign curencies.
Since 2000, the Lao authority has succeeded in keeping the exchange rate per the US dolar 
around 10,000 kip.　Since January 2005, the Bank of Laos has been implementing an exchange 
rate policy based on Regulation No. 14/BOL by determining daily reference rate based on the 
US dolar. (The Economist Group (2007).
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Table 2.2　Private Savings Deposits at Banks Denominated by Currency
(expressed by %)
Total
Foreign banks
outside Laos
Foeign banks
in Laos
State banks
Capital
Local
cities
Capital
Local
cities
Capital
Local
cities
Capital
Local
cities
83.0259.1696.270.0034.6544.1665.6360.31US dolar
14.4529.283.690.0059.0513.0620.5430.52Thai baht
2.5211.560.040.006.3042.7713.839.17Kip
100.00100.00100.000.00100.00100.00100.00100.00Total
(Source) Toyoda and Phouphet (2005b)
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2.4　Causality Test of the Two Exchange Rates
We conducted some preliminary time-series analysis of the behaviors of the two oficial 
exchange rates, i.e., the US dolar rate and Thai baht rate, using monthly data for the period of 
1995:1 through 2005:12.　Our main intention to conduct such analysis is to find the time series 
properties of the Lao exchange rate and also to test statisticaly what is the main target foreign 
currency for the Lao authority, the US dolar or the Thai baht?　Therefore, we use both total 
sample and sub-samples divided at mid 1997.
―　　―7
Figure 2.2　Kip per dolar rate
　　　　　　　Source: The Economist Group (2007), The Bank of Laos
Figure 2.3　Kip per baht rate
Toshihisa Toyoda and Kyophilavong Phouphet
We first conducted tests for stationarity of the two exchange rates.　Table 2.3 shows the 
results of DF-GLS test for unit roots and KPSS test for staionarity.　Both tests show that the 
levels of dolar and baht series are integrated even at 1% level of significance for both cases of 
constant and constant & trend terms in the models. First diferences of both series are shown 
stationary at 5% level of significance except of KPSS test with constant term in the model. 
Hence we conclude that both series are integrated of order 1, that is I(1). 　For sub samples 
1995:1–1997:6 and 1997:7–2006:9, both series show the same integrated property.
After confirming the stationarity properties of the series of first diferences of the two 
exchange rates, we inquired into the causality between the series in Granger’s sense.　Our 
maintained hypothesis is that after the Asian financial crisis the Lao monetary authority has 
turned towards a more positive control or stability of the kip/dolar rate.　As mentioned above, 
at least since January 2005, the Lao monetary authority has been actualy practicing daily opera-
tion by seting a reference kip/dolar rate and then alowing commercial banks to set their rates 
of kip/dolar and other exchange rates within very narow bounds.　We therefore expect causal-
ity from kip/dolar rate to kip/baht rate at least after the Asian financial crisis.　We first took 
first diferences of the series to conduct the conventional two variable VAR analyses.　Based 
on AIC criterion, we used five year lagged variables in al explanatory variables.　Table 2.4 
shows the result for the ful sample period, 1995:1–2006:10.　Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the 
results for the sub-samples, 1997:7–2006:10 and 1995:1–1997:6, respectively.　As shown in 
Table 2.5, clear one-way causality from kip/dolar rate to kip/baht rate exists after the Asian 
financial period.　No causality of another way from kip/baht rate to kip/dolar rate exists for 
―　　―8
Table 2.3　Unit Root Tests for Levels and First Diferences
KPSS (H0: stationarity)DF-GLS (H0: unit root)
LagVariables
constant & trendconstantconstant & trendconstant
0.3132***1.1556*** 0.6164    0.5364   1Dolar (level)
0.3071***1.1853***–0.7853    0.7333   1Baht (level)
0.1105   0.5697** –6.3033***–6.0803***0d(Dolar) (first dif.)
0.1009   0.3999*  –8.0725***–7.8839***0d(Baht) (first dif.)
Note 1: ***, ** and * indicate the significant level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
2: DF-GLS means an ADF-type test based on estimating the deterministic term first 
by a generalized least-squares procedure and subtracting it from the original series.
3: KPSS means a test for the nul hypothesis that the series is stationary (H0: yt ～ 
I(0)) against the alternative I(1) (H1: yt ～ I(1)). The procedure was proposed by 
Kwiatowski, Philips, Schmidt and Shin in 1992.
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the post-crisis period.　This coresponds to the actual daily operation of exchange management 
of the Bank of Laos as explained above.　Before the Asian financial crisis, completely opposite 
causality from kip/baht rate to kip/dolar rate was detected as shown in Table 2.6.　The reason 
for this causality might be that the oficial exchange rate was determined in such a way to 
folow the paralel market rate primarily through kip/baht rate, the biggest portion of interna-
tional transactions being made by the Thai baht.　The ful sample case as shown in Table 2.4 
shows one-sided causality from kip/dolar rate to kip/baht rate, but this may simply be due to 
the fact that the number of post-crisis samples far exceeds the one of the pre-crisis samples.
―　　―9
Table 2.4　Causality Test over 1995m1–2006m9 (using first diference series in VAR)
F-statistics
Nul Hypothesis
Lag-5Lag-4Lag-3Lag-2Lag-1
 1.425    0.844    0.732    0.726    1.852   Baht does not Granger cause dolar
 3.550*** 3.724*** 4.953*** 6.841***16.936***Dolar does not Granger cause baht
–6.832   –6.861   –6.895   –6.943   –7.000   AIC
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the significant level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 2.5　Causality Test over 1997:m7–2006m9 (using first diference series in VAR)
F-statistics
Nul Hypothesis
Lag-5Lag-4Lag-3Lag-2Lag-1
 2.289*   0.910    0.294    0.138    0.161   Baht does not Granger cause dolar
 3.789*** 3.562*** 4.789*** 6.832***16.043***Dolar does not Granger cause baht
–6.735   –6.719   –6.744   –6.796   –6.854   AIC
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the significant level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Table 2.6 Causality Test over 1995:m1–1997:m6 (using first diference series in VAR)
F-statistics
Nul Hypothesis
Lag-5Lag-4Lag-3Lag-2Lag-1
 9.261*** 10.859*** 9.790***16.232***20.536***Baht does not Granger cause dolar
 1.349     1.221    0.925    0.043    0.497   Dolar does not Granger cause baht
–9.902   –10.220   –9.814   –9.274   –9.583   AIC
Note: ***, ** and * indicate the significant level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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3.　Econometric Evaluation of Alternative Currency Arrangements
3.1　Analytical Framework
In this section we empiricaly examine macroeconomic efects of alternative exchange rate 
arangements in the Lao PDR.　Diferent from other ASEAN countries with MCP, three curen-
cies instead of two currencies have been widely used in this developing country.　In this 
special environment, is it a wise approach for the Lao authority to integrate with other countries 
through (more or less) free trade and capital movement?　There are many kinds of arrange-
ments of economic integration and the Lao PDR are already on the way of roadmap to ASEAN 
Economic Community and WTO, among others.　We here direct our atention only to desirable 
exchange rate arrangement because some recent discussions refer to introduction of Asian 
Curency Unit (ACU) to al ASEAN countries in addition to some advanced Asian countries.3)
Our approach is rather experimental and tentative.　We use a macro econometric model, 
LAOMACROMODL-2, which we developed in 2005 (Phouphet and Toyoda (2005a) and 
Toyoda and Phouphet (2005b)).　The model consists of 9 behavioral equations, 3 statistical 
equations and 12 identities.　The flow chart of causal relations of included variables is shown 
in Appendix 2. The estimation period is the one for 1989 to 2000.　The exchange rate is 
assumed to be statisticaly related to the domestic price level.　It also plays important roles 
both in the export and import equations.　In the former model, we used only kip/dolar rate as 
the exchange rate variable.　In this study, we alternatively use other exchange rates as proxy 
variables for the exchange rate.　We use other three exchange rates, i.e., kip/baht rate 
(RATET), nominal efective rate (RATENE) and an Asian Currency Unit (RATEACU) in addi-
tion to kip/dolar rate (RATEU).
We calculated a series of RATENE as a weighted average of the Thai baht and the US 
dolars, in which the weight for Thai baht was calculated as relative shares of total trade 
between Laos and Thailand and the weight for the US dolar was calculated as relative share of 
total trade between Laos and the rest of the world.　As to ACU (or Asian monetary unit, 
AMU), some authors have proposed calculated weights for currency basket.　We adopted the 
calculated values for Laos by Ogawa and Shimizu (2006b).　They considered a common 
currency basket system in East Asia (consisting of ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea) and 
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3) For example, Ogawa and Shimizu (2006a), Ogawa and Shimizu (2006b) and Watanabe and Ogura 
(2006).
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proposed a regional currency basket, which is a weighted average of these thirteen countries.　
Laos constitutes only 0.08 percent of the calculated AMU weights, which is the smalest next to 
Cambodia’s weight of 0.20, according to Ogawa and Shimizu.　They then converted the AMU 
weights of each countries to G3 (i.e., the US dolar, Yen and euro) basket weights.　For Laos, 
the converted weights (%) of AMU are 63.20 for the US dolar, 32.93 for Yen and 3.87 for 
euro.4)　We used these values to calculate relative values of rates of kip to G3 currencies to 
obtain RATEACU.
3.2　Performances of the Model
Table 3.1 exhibits the performances of the model for each case of exchange rate.　The 
column shows root mean-squared percentage errors (RMSPE) of dynamic simulations for each 
case of exchange rate.　Surprisingly, there exist no clear diferences between dolar rate and 
baht rate.　Both rates show quite good results for GDP among others.　However, nominal 
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4) Wiliamson (2005) proposed similar converted weights of East Asian currencies to G3 basket 
weights.　Although Wiliamson’s result suggests almost the same values of weights of G3 curren-
cies for Laos, we applied the more recent proposal by Ogawa and Shimizu (2006b).
Table 3.1　Comparison of Model Performance by RMSPE
RATEACURATENERATETRATEU
52.5%55.4%15.8%15.8%CP
22.7%21.6%10.8%11.0%EX
5.8%6.0%4.7%4.7%GDP
12.1%12.0%12.4%12.4%GDPNS
5.0%5.0%5.2%5.3%GDPS
5.6%5.7%4.4%4.4%NI
5.3%5.5%4.2%4.2%PDI
19.9%20.7%11.9%11.9%I
22.2%22.3%11.3%12.4%IM
12.0%11.0%12.4%12.7%PL
12.7%12.9%9.9%9.8%TAX
5.5%5.7%4.4%4.5%WAGE
Note: Each colum shows the result of in-sample final test for some 
selected variables when the designated exchange rate is used in 
the model.
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efective rate (RATENE) and Asian curency unit (ACU) does not perform wel, particularly for 
GDP and trade variables (EX and IM).　This may reflect the actual international trade setle-
ment in Lao PDR, that is, either the US dolar or the Thai baht, not the combined average, is 
used for trade with foreigners.　A curency basket imposed from outside may not perform wel 
in international trade setlement because it does not reflect the reality of curencies used in Lao 
PDR.
3.3　Efects of Monetary Policy
We next consider efects of restrictive monetary policy.　The banking and financial system 
has not been wel developed yet.　In our model, only channel of an increase or decrease 
in money supply is through afecting on the domestic price level. We assume that a maintained 
decrease in money supply by 10 bilion kip is implemented.　There is no channel to afect on 
interest rate, so the efect appears on the price level directly and then afect on real variables 
including GDP.
Table 3.2 shows the simulated effects for four years for each case of exchange rate 
arangements.　We can see that, as far as monetary policy concerned, alternative exchange rate 
like RATENE or RATEACU performs wel.　However, since the efect is only through the 
price level, we must be careful to give any clear comparison in this case of monetary policy.
3.4　Efects of Mixed Policy
Our model has a salient feature to consider fiscal and monetary policy together.　In particu-
lar, we advocated before that restrictive monetary policy should be implemented when an expan-
sive fiscal policy is conducted.　In other word, as a practicaly best policy mix for the present 
stage of economic development in Lao PDR, an expansive fiscal and restrictive monetary policy 
is recommended.　In this section, we show the results for this policy mix by increasing both 
government investment and expenditure by 5 bilion kip each (in total 10 bilion kip) together 
with a decrease of money supply by 10 bilion kip.
Table 3.3 shows the simulated results for four years.　The case of RATEU shows a litle 
beter performance in the efects on GDP and the price level although the efects on import (IM) 
and export (EX) are reversed by smal margins. This may reflect the actual situation that Lao 
trade with Thailand dominates other cases and the Thai baht rate is more sensitively reflected to 
the trade variables.　RATENE has no remarkable results.　However, RTAEACU shows a very 
surprising result that the efect on GDP is the best among the four cases.　However, checking 
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the efects on other variables carefuly, we find that it does not help much trade variables by 
greatly deteriorating the trade balance in fact.　Only reason why it gives a strikingly good 
result on GDP is solely through a very strong pressure on deflation so that real GDP is pushed 
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Table 3.2　Efects of Restrictive Monetary Policy
(1) RATEU
Year 4Year 3Year 2Year 1
5.004.543.982.65CP
–1.38–1.27–1.29–1.23EX
4.213.753.823.67GDP
8.717.758.458.76IM
–11.72–10.53–12.18–9.78PL
(2) RATET
Year 4Year 3Year 2Year 1
5.464.814.172.76CP
–1.63–1.47–1.46–1.40EX
4.724.014.013.83GDP
9.568.158.699.01IM
–12.28–11.24–12.78–10.27PL
(3) RATENE
Year 4Year 3Year 2Year 1
8.396.956.064.00CP
–2.99–2.16–2.18–2.09EX
7.615.755.845.55GDP
16.1811.6812.7213.04IM
–17.40–15.19–17.50–14.50PL
(4) RATEACU
Year 4Year 3Year 2Year 1
8.286.915.973.90CP
–2.93–2.19–2.18–2.08EX
7.455.755.785.42GDP
15.8911.8012.7312.90IM
–16.93–14.79–16.96–14.16PL
Note: Figures show the percentage valus of (simulated value – baseline 
value) * 100 / (baseline value).
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up by price effect only.　Considering al relevant macro variables, we can conclude that 
RATEU gives the best efects on overal macroeconomic variables by policy mix of expansive 
fiscal and restrictive monetary policy.
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Table 3.3　Efects of Policy Mix
(1) RATEU
Year 4Year 3Year 2Year 1
7.977.196.464.50CP
0.200.370.681.74EX
6.765.836.046.25GDP
12.6611.2612.4413.66IM
1.692.986.2613.89PL
(2) RATET
Year 4Year 3Year 2Year 1
7.917.046.294.38CP
0.340.420.781.95EX
6.785.725.886.08GDP
12.3810.9811.9713.18IM
2.683.116.6714.34PL
(3) RATENE
Year 4Year 3Year 2Year 1
8.396.956.064.00CP
–2.99–2.16–2.18–2.09EX
7.615.755.845.55GDP
16.1811.6812.7213.04IM
–17.40–15.19–17.50–14.50PL
(4) RATEACU
Year 4Year 3Year 2Year 1
11.869.778.595.82CP
–1.01–0.52–0.160.74EX
10.778.038.158.08GDP
22.3417.2518.8320.20IM
–6.24–3.56–1.255.12PL
Note: Figures show the percentage values of (simulated value – baseline 
value) * 100 / baseline value.
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4.　Conclusion
We have studied some macroeconomic aspects of recent development of Lao PDR with 
special reference to economic/financial integration in East Asia.　Many authors just mention of 
ASEAN as a region, e.g., ASEAN plus three, but there is a clear divide between the two groups 
of countries in the region.　Among them, Laos needs several more years to develop its finan-
cial institutions and to strengthen fiscal and monetary policy channels.　Under this underdevel-
oped macroeconomic environment, the country is going to be a possible member of an ASEAN 
plus X community.　It is presumed assumption that every country wil receive benefits from an 
umbrela of economic (or financial) integration, particularly avoiding a sudden financial crisis 
like that of 1997.　However, Laos has a peculiar multi curency (actualy three curencies) phe-
nomenon and careful introduction of currency unit or exchange rate arrangement is necessary.　
There is strong evidence that the Lao monetary authority has shifted its reference base from the 
Thai baht to the US dolar after the Asian crisis.　According to our econometric simulations, 
the current exchange rate policy is admitedly approved compared with other arrangements.　
However, selecting optimal weights of currencies for Lao PDR should be carefuly proceeded 
with special reference to reality of international transactions.
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Appendix 1: MainVariable and Data Sources
SourceVariablesUnitCode
2001 Would Development Indicators CD-ROMEndogenousBil.KipsCGGovernment consumption(real)
2001 Would Development Indicators CD-ROMEndogenousBil.KipsCPPrivate consumption (real)
2001 International Financial Statistics CD-ROMEndogenousBil.KipsEXExport (real)
2001 International Financial Statistics CD-ROMEndogenousBil.KipsIMImport (real)
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001Endogenous1995=100PLGeneral Price
Bank of The Lao PDR, Annual Report, Various IssuesExogenousBil.KipsNOTAXNon-tax revenue (real)
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001ExogenousKip/DolarRATEUExchange rate (Kip/Dolar)
Bank of The Lao PDR, Annual Report, Various IssuesEndogenousBil.KipsREVGovernment revenue (real)
Bank of The Lao PDR, Annual Report, Various IssuesExogenousPercentRISILending rate (nominal)
IMF Staf Country Report Various IssuesEndogenousBil.KipsDTAXDirect tax (real)
IMF Staf Country Report Various IssuesEndogenousBil.KipsITAXIndirect tax (real)
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001ExogenousBil.KipsFDIForeign direct investment (real)
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001EndogenousBil.KipsGDPGross domestic product
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001EndogenousBil.KipsGDPNSPotential non-agriculture GDP (real)
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001EndogenousBil.KipsGDPASPotential agriculture GDP (real)
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001ExogenousBil.KipsIGGovernment investment (real)
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001Exogenous1995=100IPImport price
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001Exogenous1000 personsLAAgriculture population
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001Endogenous1000 personsLNNon-agriculture population
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001ExogenousBil.KipsMONPMoney supply (nominal)
Key Indicators Of Developing Asian And Pacific Countries 2001Endogenous1000 personsNPTotal population
Basic Statistic of The Lao PDR 75-2000Exogenous1000 HectorHPAAgriculture area
CalculationEndogenousBil.KipsKCapital stock (real)
National Statictic CenterExogenousBil.KipsDIDomestic investment (real)
Source: the authors
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